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NOTE: DUTY OF CONTINUED CHILD SUPPORT PAST
THE AGE OF MAJORITY
Appellant George Elkins, a divorced father, on his own volition
stopped paying court-ordered child support and medical payments
when his son Mark reached the statutory age of majority.' Appellee
Jackie Elkins, who had been awarded custody and support pay-
ments from the appellant in the divorce decree, filed a petition for
contempt against the appellant for nonsupport and requested the
court to order the appellant to continue his support for as long as
his son remained in college' because Mark was a diagnosed dys-
lexic.3 It was appellee's contention that because of his learning disa-
bility her son would be unable to support himself without a college
education.' Opposing the petition, the appellant produced evidence
that Mark was not physically impaired, was continuing to partici-
pate in high school sports, and had actually held previous summer
jobs.'
The court ordered the appellant to continue support payments
until Mark had completed high school.' The court specifically re-
tained jurisdiction pending Mark's acceptance by college. When
Mark presented evidence of that acceptance, the court modified its
order to require appellant to continue the weekly child support for
as long as Mark remained in college and was satisfactorily pursuing
his study of forestry. It was further required that the appellant be
responsible for Mark's medical expenses during this period.7 From
this modified court order, the father appealed, and the Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 553 S.W.2d
34 (1977).
It has long been recognized in Arkansas case law that the disso-
lution of a marriage through a divorce proceeding, with the subse-
quent award of custody of children of the marriage to the mother,
does not relieve the father of the obligation to support his children.'
1. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 57-103 (Cum. Supp. 1977) provides in part that "[aill persons of
the age of eighteen (18) years shall be considered to have reached the age of majority and be
of full age for all purposes, and until the age of eighteen (18) is attained, they shall be
considered minors."
2. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 64, 553 S.W.2d 34, 34 (1977).
3. Dyslexia is a medical label for an impairment in the ability to read due to a brain
dysfunction. Id. at 65, 553 S.W.2d at 35.
4. Id. at 66, 553 S.W.2d at 35.
5. Id. at 65, 553 S.W.2d at 34.
6. Id. at 64, 553 S.W.2d at 34.
7. Id. at 64-65, 553 S.W.2d at 34.
8. Reiter v. Reiter, 225 Ark. 157, 278 S.W.2d 644 (1955); Holt v. Holt, 42 Ark. 495 (1883).
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This guideline of continued obligation applies even if the father is
granted the divorce but the mother retains custody of the children.,
However, there are no statutorily established guidelines as to the
duration and extent of the support obligation or upon whom that
obligation falls.'" Instead, the court is given considerable discretion
by the statutes to determine what is reasonable in ordering child
support."
Although there is no statutorily established age limit after
which a divorced parent's duty to support children automatically
ceases,' 2 the general rule established in Arkansas case law, as in the
majority of other states,'" is that the duty to support will terminate
when the child reaches the statutory age of majority. This general
rule was first recognized in Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Foreman,4
which involved an appeal regarding the amount of jury-awarded
damages for the benefit of the widow and minor children of a farmer
killed as a result of the negligent operation of a train. The Arkansas
Supreme Court held that the damages were too high under the
circumstances and stated, "Ordinarily, there is no legal obligation
on the part of a parent to contribute to the maintenance and support
of his children after they become of age."' 5
In Worthington v. Worthington" the central issue of the father's
appeal was his continued liability to support his adult daughter as
ordered in a chancery decree. This case involved an alleged implied
contract for the father to continue support until the daughter was
9. Shue v. Shue, 162 Ark. 216, 258 S.W. 128 (1924).
10. In this day of gender nondiscrimination, fathers may be awarded custody of the
children, and mothers can be required to pay child support if the disparity in parental
incomes warrants it. Barnhard v. Barnhard, 252 Ark. 167, 477 S.W.2d 845 (1972).
11: Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1211 (Repl. 1962) provides in part that "[wihen a decree shall
be entered, the court shall make such order touching the alimony for the wife and care of the
children, if there be any, as from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case
shall be reasonable." Aside from Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1213 (Repl. 1962), which allows the
court to make "proper" alterations in support orders on the application of either party, the
quoted statute is the only one dealing with the establishment of child support following a
divorce or separation proceeding.
12. In the absence of a specified termination point, such as a birthday, in the support
order, a divorced father is not allowed to terminate his support payments on his own volition.
Only the court has the authority to modify, extend, or terminate a decree for child support.
Thompson v. Thompson, 254 Ark. 881, 496 S.W.2d 425 (1973); Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589,
361 S.W.2d 92 (1962).
13. An annotation concerning parental obligation to support adult children cites cases
from thirty-six states, the District of Columbia, Canada, and England, recognizing the gen-
eral rule that there is no obligation to support a post-majority child. Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 910
(1948).
14. 196 Ark. 636, 119 S.W.2d 747 (1938).
15. Id. at 651, 119 S.W.2d at 754.
16. 207 Ark. 185, 179 S.W.2d 648 (1944).
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employed and self-supporting. After the daughter reached the age
of majority and had finished two years of college, the father ob-
tained a job for her, but she refused it and demanded support until
she finished college. The chancellor decreed that the father had to
continue support. In overruling this decree, the Arkansas Supreme
Court noted that the daughter was a normal person in every respect
and that all legal obligation to support her had ceased when she
reached the age of majority, unless a contract to the contrary ex-
isted." Finding such a contract, the court held that the daughter's
refusal to take the offered job made it impossible for the father to
perform his promise. Therefore, the contract could be rescinded.' 8
Similarly, in Childers v. Childers" the court considered a father's
appeal of the alimony and child support provision incorporated in
a divorce decree and held that the father would be relieved of any
legal obligation to support his daughter after she reached the age of
eighteen.20
The court again addressed the issue of whether a divorced fa-
ther is obligated to pay for a college education for a daughter who
had reached the age of majority in Riegler v. Riegler, 2 in which a
chancellor's decree continuing child support until college gradua-
tion was in part overruled. The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded
that there was no legal obligation to assist the daughter financially
while she attended college, relying upon the chancellor's findings
that the eighteen year old girl was without physical or mental in-
firmities, that she was not in any other way abnormal, and that no
contract was involved.22 It also noted the chancellor's reasoning that
a college education is very important in modern society and that, if
the father is financially able, the child should be provided with
support adequate to maintain her usual custom of living, which in
this case included at least some college. 3 According to the court, the
child's normality was the prevailing factor, and the chancellor's
reasoning was rejected.
As with most general principles, the rule regarding termination
17. Id. at 188, 179 S.W.2d at 649.
18. The court also noted that it would be "fine" if the father would pay for his daugh-
ter's college education but that this sacrifice could only be voluntary and result from contin-
ued parental love rather than from a court order enforcing unassumed legal obligations. Id.
at 190, 179 S.W.2d at 650.
19. 229 Ark. 11, 313 S.W.2d 75 (1958).
20. Id. at 14, 313 S.W.2d at 77 (citing Worthington v. Worthington, 207 Ark. 185, 179
S.W.2d 648 (1944)).
21. 259 Ark. 203, 532 S.W.2d 734 (1976).
22. Id. at 210-11, 532 S.W.2d at 738.
23. Id. at 211, 532 S.W.2d at 739.
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of parental obligation for child support at the age of majority has
an exception. First recognized by the court in Upchurch v.
Upchurch,4 the exception requires the divorced parent to continue
support of "adult" children 25 if circumstances exist which make
continuation necessary. Determination of necessity is within the
court's discretion." In Upchurch this exception was stated as dic-tum, as the court declined to rule on whether the self-supporting son
or the adult daughter had any right to support from the divorced
father. Instead, the court affirmed the chancellor's denial of ali-
mony for the wife and held that the children were not barred from
instituting a suit against their father, with the outcome of that suit
to be dependent upon all the facts and circumstances.
In Arkansas, as in a substantial minority of the other states,
27
a persuasive circumstance justifying post-majority continued sup-
port is the existence of a mentally or physically disabling condition
which would make it difficult for the child to be self-supporting. In
Eskridge v. Eskridge2 8 the court affirmed a chancellor's decree refus-
ing to reduce the amount of child support that a divorced father was
required to provide for his twenty-three year old son.29 The son had
been physically injured at birth, had never been able to work pro-
ductively, and was unable to help himself or his mother. The court
made particular reference to the testimony of a doctor who had
advised the boy to give up his job in a drugstore because it was
detrimental to his health. 0
The Upchurch exception was again invoked when the court in
Petty v. Petty3' reversed a chancellor's elimination of child support
for an epileptic eighteen year old daughter. That adult child had
suffered from grand mal epilepsy since the age of two and had been
on daily medication since that time to prevent convulsions. In addi-
tion, there was testimony that the girl occasionally lost control of
members of her body and was unable to drive a car, as evidenced
24. 196 Ark. 324, 117 S.W.2d 339 (1938).
25. The phrase "adult children" is used by the court to refer to persons eighteen or
older.
26. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 196 Ark. 324, 326, 117 S.W.2d 339, 340 (1938).
27. Twenty-one states recognize that "[wihere a child is of weak body or mind, unable
to care for itself after coming of age, . . . the parental rights and duties remain thereafter
practically unchanged, and . . . the parent's duty to support the child continues as before."
Annot., 1 A.L.R.2d 910, 921 (1948).
28. 216 Ark. 592, 226 S.W.2d 811 (1950).
29. In 1950 Ark. Stat. Ann. § 57-103 (1947) specified that for males the age of majority
was twenty-one. This law was amended in 1975 to make the age of majority eighteen for males
as well as females. Id. (Cum. Supp. 1977).
30. Eskridge v. Eskridge, 216 Ark. 592, 593, 226 S.W.2d 811, 812 (1950).
31. 252 Ark. 1032, 482 S.W.2d 119 (1972).
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by several previous accidents.32 The appellee father maintained that
the girl was not disabled, only handicapped. The chancellor agreed
and ruled that the daughter was not disabled, though her college
tuition was being paid by the Arkansas Rehabilitation Services.3 3 In
reversing, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the chancellor's
ruling of nondisability was in error and found that the daughter was
unable to earn a living and needed specialized education, as recog-
nized by the state in paying her tuition. The court specifically
pointed out that there was little difference between being disabled
and being handicapped, in terms of capacity for self-support.34
The only departure the court has allowed from the requirement
of a debilitating condition was in Matthews v. Matthews, 3 wherein
a father was required to continue support of his normal eighteen
year old daughter for an additional six months until she completed
high school. The court characterized this exception as only a "slight
extension" of the father's minimum duty and noted that a high
school diploma was of "inestimable value" to a young person seek-
ing to support herself.36 The court also assumed from the evidence
that the daughter would have had to drop out of high school if the
extension was not affirmed, since the father offered no evidence to
the contrary.
This extension of the general rule's exception makes it apparent
that the court's primary focus has been the adult child's capacity
for self-support. If there is evidence that the child will be unable to
provide for himself because of a physically handicapping condition
or the disadvantage of not having a high school diploma, the court
will require continued support. These exceptions seem to be di-
rected not only toward protecting the welfare of the disabled child,
but also toward protecting the public's interest in not having to
support a child whose parents are financially able to do so.37 In case
32. Id. at 1034, 482 S.W.2d at 120.
33. Id.
34. The court stated,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "disabled" as inter alia,
"incapacitated by or as if by illness, injury or wounds: Crippled". The word
"handicapped" is defined inter alia, "A disadvantage that makes achievement
unusually difficult. A physical disability that limits the capacity to work". It is at
once apparent that there is a similarity in these definitions, though the word
"disabled" denotes a greater inability to function in a normal manner, but there is
nothing in our cases indicating that a disabled person is entitled, after becoming
an adult, to continued financial aid from the father, while one who is only handi-
capped, is not entitled to such aid.
Id. at 1035-36, 482 S.W.2d at 121.
35. 245 Ark. 1, 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968).
36. Id. at 3, 430 S.W.2d at 865.
37. The dual duty toward the child and the public has a longer history than the general
1978]
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law prior to Elkins, however, in no instance had the court required
a divorced parent to provide support for an adult child's college
education in the absence of a preponderance of the evidence indicat-
ing the inability of the child to support himself Without that educa-
tion.3
Writing for the majority in Elkins, Justice Roy recognized the
general rule that parental obligation for child support normally
ceases. when the child reaches the age of majority. However, the
court also recognized the established exception to that rule, citing
the child support statute regarding reasonableness of the decree 39
and the Upchurch dictum that support obligations will continue
post-majority if there are circumstances that make it necessary. 0
Noting that a determination of the presence of exceptional circum-
stances must be made from the facts of each case,4' the court af-
firmed the chancellor's ruling that child support should continue
post-majority for as long as the Elkins' son remained in college on
the grounds that he would find it difficult to support himself with-
out that education because of his dyslexia." The court made partic-
ular reference to the lack of distinction between a handicap and a
disability that it had specified in the Petty decision 3 and reaffirmed
its position that a handicapped adult child should continue to re-
ceive support so as to avoid becoming a burden on society." In
addition, the court invoked its established principle that it would
not reverse a chancellor unless the latter's findings were against the
preponderance of the evidence and held that the chancellor's ruling
was amply supported by such a preponderance.45
rule and its exception. "The duty of parents to provide for their minor children is a principle
of natural law, and this obligation to support the children begotten by them is grounded, not
only on the duty of a father to his child, but also to the public." Johnson v. Mitchell, 164
Ark. 1, 3, 260 S.W. 710, 711 (1924).
38. See Riegler v. Riegler, 259 Ark. 203, 210, 532 S.W.2d 734, 738 (1976) (distinguishing
Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1, 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968), by stating that the duty to provide
support "has not been extended to an entire college education in Arkansas under such facts
as appear of record in this case").
39. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-1211 (Repl. 1962). The relevant portion of this statute is quoted
in note 11 supra.
40. Upchurch v. Upchurch, 196 Ark. 324, 327, 117 S.W.2d 339, 340 (1938).
41. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 68, 553 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1977).
42. Id.
43. Id. (citing Petty v. Petty, 252 Ark. 1032, 1035-36, 482 S.W.2d 119, 121 (1972), for
its definitions of "disabled" and "handicapped," the relevant language of which is quoted in
note 34 supra).
44. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 68, 553 S.W.2d 34, 36 (1977).
45. Id. at 68-69, 553 S.W.2d at 36. Although acknowledging that the son was in good
physical health, the court focused its attention primarily on an opinion of the son's doctor
that he should be given an opportunity to go to college, the appellee's testimony that she
[Vol. 1
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In the lone dissent, Justice Byrd took marked exception to the
ruling of the majority that the son's dyslexia was a sufficiently disa-
bling condition to warrant the potential continuation of support for
four years or more. To support the view that the "undisputed"
evidence indicated no disability, the dissent emphasized the son's
testimony that he was in good physical condition and that he could
perform jobs that required hard or light physical labor." It also
noted that the son "is capable of and does run ten miles cross-
country in a day."47 Citing the age of majority statute,"' the dissent
concluded that the son was an adult for all purposes except for the
court's opinion that everyone should have a college education.49 Ac-
cording to the dissent, the real problems in the case-the son's
bellicose attitude and the subsequent estrangement between him
and his father5r-did not warrant court interference in the decision
between the appellant and his adult son as to whether the latter
should go to collegeA'
In holding that the preponderance of the evidence supported
the chancellor's ruling, the Elkins majority opinion seemed to apply
the established exception that extends parental obligation for child
support. This is evident from the court's strong reliance on Petty.
However, even in Petty the concern of the court had focused on
whether the adult child was able to provide for herself so as to
protect the child's interests while preventing her from becoming a
burden upon society.
Therefore, it seems that the dissent in Elkins had ample reason
to point to the undisputed evidence that the son was not disabled
by his dyslexia, at least not to the extent of being unable to support
himself. That evidence included the son's own testimony regarding
his physical capabilities, which received comment by both the ma-
jority and the dissenting opinion; his testimony that he had worked
for the county road department at ten cents per hour above the
minimum wage; and the fact that no previous employer had in-
thought her son would be unable to support himself without further schooling, and the son's
testimony that he had been unable to obtain a job that paid well. The court also gave
deference to the chancellor's assessment of the son's condition while he was on the witness
stand, saying that it "would be much superior to ours from the cold record." Id.
46. Id. at 69, 553 S.W.2d at 37 (Byrd, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 69-70, 553 S.W.2d at 37. The current version of the statute is quoted in note
1 supra.
49. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 70, 553 S.W.2d 34, 37 (1977) (Byrd, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 69, 553 S.W.2d at 37.
51. Id. at 70, 553 S.W.2d at 37.
19781
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quired about his learning disability." The son was able to drive a
car, unlike the epileptic daughter in Petty, and he had already
obtained a high school diploma prior to the final extension of the
support order, unlike the normal adult daughter in Matthews. Fur-
thermore, the son had not been advised by his doctor to quit any of
the summer jobs that he held, a primary factor in the court's requir-
ing continued support for the physically infirm son in Eskridge.
Since the Elkins court had before it in the trial record direct evi-
dence that the "handicapped" adult son was able to do physical
work, it could have easily concluded, as did the dissent, that the
preponderance of the evidence did not support the chancellor's rul-
ing that the son was unable to support himself without a college
education.- Consequently, a determination of the actual controlling
factors or considerations is left to conjecture.
Two such speculations could presage developing trends in the
area of support for adult children. It may be that the court chose to
focus on the presence in the record of the label "handicap" as auto-
matically establishing a prima facie case of disability without re-
quiring convincing evidence of actual incapacity to work.54 But
being dyslexic does not mean an individual is so physically handi-
capped that he is incapable of supporting himself in some form of
compensated work without obtaining specialized, institutional edu-
cation.55 Nevertheless, because of the Elkins decision a petitioner on
behalf of an adult child may be reasonably assured of having af-
52. Abstract and Brief of Appellant at 20-21, Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 553 S.W.2d
34 (1977).
53. According to published statistics, the son might have earned as much or more
income in manual labor occupations not requiring a college education as in his chosen field
of forestry. As a forester with a B.A. degree, he could expect to start within a range of $8500
to $9500 per year. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 1875, Occupa-
tional Outlook Handbook (1976). As a truckdriver's helper in Little Rock, Arkansas, he could
expect an annual wage in the neighborhood of $8500, and as a truckdriver, $11,500. U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dep't of Labor, Bull. No. 1917, Union Wages and Hours; Local
Truckdrivers and Helpers, July 1, 1975, Table 8 (1976).
54. The mother offered no direct evidence of her son's alleged incapacity to work other
than her personal belief and the doctor's general observation that the boy should be given an
opportunity to go to college. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 65-66, 553 S.W.2d 34, 35 (1977).
The doctor provided no medical reasons to support his opinion, nor did he make a connection
between the boy's learning disability and this opinion. In contrast, the appellant offered the
son's own testimony that he could do physical labor. Id. at 69, 553 S.W.2d at 37 (Byrd, J.,
dissenting).
55. Dyslexia is defined as "a level of reading ability markedly below that expected on
the basis of the individual's level of over-all intelligence or ability in skills." Stedman's
Medical Dictionary 432 (4th unabridged lawyers' ed. 1976). It involves "inability to read more
than a few lines with understanding." Id. at 488 (1st ed. 1961). It would not appear to fall
within the "medicolegal" definition of "disability," viz., "[a] term signifying loss of function
and earning power." Id. at 400 (4th unabridged lawyers' ed. 1976).
[Vol. 1
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firmed an order requiring continued support payments for a college
education from a divorced parent, provided the petitioner raises a
shibboleth of any type of disability or handicap and generally al-
leges an incapacity for self-support without costly additional educa-
tion. This extension of the duty to support a child, or its shift in
focus, currently has no foreseeable limits, and divorced parents can
no longer rely on the old criterion of verified, actual incapacity for
self-support.
On the other hand, it may be that the majority's attitude "that
everybody ought to have a college education""6 is closer to the actual
controlling consideration. There had been no previous decision re-
quiring a divorced parent to provide a college education for his adult
child, except when the child's incapacity for self-support was estab-
lished. On the contrary, Riegler, only one year prior to Elkins, had
reaffirmed the court's position that a college education was not a
necessity, specifically distinguishing Petty on its facts. Perhaps the
court in Elkins was trying to slip the obligation of providing a col-
lege education in through the back door by gradually diminishing
and ultimately eliminating the need for special circumstances.
If the Arkansas Supreme Court is changing its position to advo-
cate that children should go to college and that divorced parents can
be rightfully ordered to provide support to make attendance possi-
ble, regardless of disability, several issues will undoubtedly arise in
future litigation, as they have in other jurisdictions. These issues
include whether the noncustodial parent has any right to determine
or participate in the choice of institutions and course of study, as
well as what constitutep reasonable expenses;57 whether the child's
ability or capacity for college work should be considered;58 and
whether the parental duty should continue past the attainment of
majority by the child."
In the meantime attorneys would be well advised to adopt a
procedure which the Arkansas Supreme Court favorably recognized
in Thompson v. Thompson. 10 In reaffirming its position that a chan-
cellor's decree must specify when child support is to terminate,
56. Elkins v. Elkins, 262 Ark. 63, 70, 553 S.W.2d 34, 37 (1977) (Byrd, J., dissenting).
57. See, e.g., Bateman v. Bateman, 224 Ga. 20, 159 S.E.2d 387 (1968); Esteb v. Esteb,
138 Wash. 174, 244 P. 264 (1926). The latter case is especially important on the "right" to
receive a college education.
58. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 346 Mich. 418, 78 N.W.2d 216 (1956).
59. See, e.g., Hight v. Hight, 5 Ill. App. 3d 991, 284 N.E.2d 679 (1972) (holding that
the parental duty will continue post-majority). But see, e.g., West v. West, 131 Vt. 621, 312
A.2d 920 (1973). See generally Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 1093 (1971); Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 1207
(1957).
60. 254 Ark. 881, 496 S.W.2d 425 (1973).
1978]
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rather than allowing a father to eliminate it unilaterally of his own
volition, the court stated that "litigation such as this could be
avoided by setting forth in the decree under what circumstances
monthly child support and alimony payments terminate without
the necessity of court intervention."'" If counsel in the Elkins case
had used this procedure while drafting the proposed decree for the
chancellor's approval, the litigation regarding the continued sup-
port obligation might not have arisen.
James M. Ammel
61. Id. at 884, 496 S.W.2d at 427.
